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8The Missing Jurisprudence 
of the Legislated Constitution
robin west
Does the fourteenth Amendment and its Equal Protec-tion Clause—the promise that “no state shall deny equal pro-tection of the laws”—have any relevance to the progressive 
project of reducing economic inequality in various spheres of life or, more 
modestly, of ameliorating the multiple vulnerabilities of this country’s 
poor people? The short answer, I believe, is, it depends. It will depend, 
in 2020, just as it depends now, on what we mean by the Constitution we 
are expounding: the Constitution as read and interpreted by courts—
the adjudicated Constitution—or what I propose to call the legislated 
Constitution, the Constitution looked to by the conscientious legislator 
as he or she seeks to fulfill her political obligations. My claim in this 
chapter is that the legislated, rather than the adjudicated, Constitution 
can more plausibly be read as guaranteeing an equality that is supportive 
of progressive goals rather than in tension with them. Programmatically, 
I will suggest that progressive lawyers should take this opportunity of 
their respite from judicial power and attend to the development of that 
Constitution, so that we might at some point in the future urge fidelity 
to it on the part of our representatives, rather than continue to attend, 
with the same intense devotion that still characterizes our current legal 
zeitgeist, to the adjudicated Constitution.
sS
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The very coherence of a “legislated Constitution,” however, depends 
upon an accompanying jurisprudence (or, awkwardly, legisprudence), 
and that is a jurisprudence that is currently entirely missing from even 
the most utopian constitutional theorizing. I will conclude by suggest-
ing what that jurisprudence might look like and what its creation, or 
rediscovery, will require.
Equality and the Adjudicated Constitution
The question before us in this chapter is whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of equality implies the existence of social or 
economic welfare rights, and consequently mandates some level of con-
gressional or state legislative intervention, so as to give those rights sub-
stance. Now, as a matter of doctrine, this question is almost absurd. 
Doctrinally, it is as clear as these things can ever possibly be that the Equal 
Protection Clause, as expounded by courts, carries no such meaning.1 
What the “equal protection” promised by the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires, according to the Supreme Court’s interpretive gloss, is a lim-
ited right to be free of the legislator’s casual or malign discriminatory 
instincts toward specified groups, as expressed in laws that unequally 
discriminate for irrational reasons against those groups’ members. The 
vague phrase “equal protection” is thereby given a specific, and narrow, 
content: The point of the clause is not a broad guarantee of protection 
(equal or otherwise) against various unstated evils or harms—such as 
private violence, or natural catastrophe, or war, or poverty, or economic 
subordination, or any other interference with welfare—but rather, a 
guarantee of protection against pernicious laws and lawmakers that ir-
rationally discriminate against some group of citizens, when and if such 
affirmative government services are offered. The modifier “equal,” on 
this reading, is reduced to a limited guarantee of legislative rationality. 
The point of the clause is not to render various groups equal, but to 
render them, if various conditions are met, equal beneficiaries of some 
governmental actions, and then only if the inequality is a function of ir-
rational discriminatory animus. All of this has been much criticized by 
the Court’s critics.
What’s gone relatively unnoticed, however, or at least unremarked 
upon, in the course of the development of this judicial interpretation 
is the fate of the two-letter preposition in the phrase “equal protection 
of the laws.” The “of ” in the phrase “of the laws,” again in the Court’s 
reading of the amendment, is replaced by the preposition “against.” We 
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are not, under the judicial construction of the phrase, entitled to equal 
protection of the law, or of the state, or of the lawmaker, in virtually 
any sense. We are, rather, somewhat entitled to equal protection against 
law—or at least, some of us are sometimes protected against one kind 
of bad law, and that is a law that is bad because it irrationally discrimi-
nates on the basis of a short list of specified characteristics, such as race, 
ethnicity, sex, or religious affiliation. That transformation of the clause’s 
meaning—from “equal protection of law” to “equal protection against 
law”—has been hugely consequential. The Fourteenth Amendment, 
intended, perhaps, as a guarantor of the benefits of law to those who had 
previously not enjoyed its protections, has become, instead, a guarantor 
against legalistic malfeasance. Law itself, on this formal understanding, 
rather than being construed as a blessing to be bestowed equally on all 
citizens, is construed as an evil, against which the Constitution stands 
guard.
What has this formal rather than substantive understanding of 
equality meant, in practice, for the country’s poor? To be sure, it is 
not  nothing—poor people are sometimes irrationally discriminated 
against by legislators.2 But as a weapon for combating poverty itself, the 
promise of formal equality is baldly illusory. It is not, after all, poverty 
that is targeted by an antidiscrimination principle, even if such a prin-
ciple can be read capaciously so as to prohibit discrimination against 
the poor. It is, rather, the irrational failure to grant poor individuals 
goods or privileges where that grant would be forthcoming but for the 
individual’s impoverishment, and is being denied for no good reason. 
It is the failure, in effect, to spot the diamond in the rough, and to give 
the diamond his due; it is not the nickel-and-dimed living conditions 
of those persons—whether they are diamonds or not—who actually 
live in the rough, which is targeted by formal, rather than substantive, 
equality. For the occasional diamond so uncovered, this might be sub-
stantial  protection indeed. For poor people in general, however, this is 
 nothing—no  protection at all.
An argument can surely be made that the Court’s displacement of the 
“of ” with “against,” in the phrase “equal protection of law,” as well as 
the formal understanding of equality that follows from it, is more than 
a little in tension with the Fourteenth Amendment’s plain meaning, 
language, logic, and noncontroversial history. The amendment doesn’t 
say that all citizens are granted a right to equal protection from law or 
against law; it says that all citizens are granted a right to the equal pro-
tection of law. Laws, and the states and legislators that produce them, 
are constructed by the most natural meaning of the amendment as being 
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on the whole rather good things that states ought to bestow equally, so 
as to protect people from some evil or harm from which they might suf-
fer in the absence of law’s protection. It doesn’t posit law itself as the evil 
against which individuals need protection. Rather, the absence of law is 
constructed by the most natural meaning of that sentence, as being the 
bad thing from which citizens must be protected. By the amendment’s 
language, it is the absence of law, not the discriminatory law, which is 
conducive to the conditions against which states have a duty to protect 
us. Furthermore, states, by the plain language of the amendment, must 
affirmatively do something; thus, it seems to be state inaction, not state 
action, which is unconstitutional. One thing states must do is protect 
people, and they must do it, furthermore, through affirmative acts of 
lawmaking.
Why, then, has the Supreme Court so steadfastly abided by its formal 
understanding of equality, which is so seemingly belied by the history 
and language itself?3 Why, indeed, has it failed to even acknowledge these 
claims?4 It seems to me that there are three possibilities. One possibility, 
suggested by a number of scholars, is institutional. The Court wants to 
require only what it can confidently enforce, and while it can mandate 
that irrational and discriminatory laws be struck—that action is rela-
tively costless—it simply can’t enforce a broad antisubordinationist or 
welfare-based understanding of equality upon unwilling state actors.5 
A second possibility—and this is more in line with the foundational 
assumption of the American Constitutional Society (ACS)—is that the 
Court has chosen this particular doctrinal path, as well as a number of 
others over the last half century, for essentially political and ideological 
reasons. I am dubious: I don’t think this is a plausible account of the last 
half century of judicial practice.
Let me suggest a somewhat different explanation for the Court’s 
attraction to formal equality and its hostility to substantive understand-
ings of equality. At least a part of the story regarding the Court’s insist-
ence on a formal rather than substantive understanding of equality might 
be jurisprudential, rather than either political or institutional. Look at 
one striking feature of the formal meaning of equality embraced by the 
Court, which has gone relatively unexamined in scholarly literature: the 
degree to which the formal understanding of the constitutional equality 
guarantee—that legislators must treat likes alike, differences differently, 
and must more or less rationally ascertain those differences—echoes, 
in fact, perfectly mirrors, judicial understanding of the requirements 
of stare decisis, of the meaning of precedent, of the meaning of legal 
justice, of the rule of law, and so forth. Judges, when deciding virtually 
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all cases, must treat likes alike and rationally discern differences, and 
they must do so, furthermore, toward the end of doing justice. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, given this understanding of the meaning of justice, 
given our history of irrational racism emanating from legislatures, and 
given an incredibly wide degree of interpretive latitude, the twentieth-
 century Supreme Court wound up reading the equality provision of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as imposing the same legalistic requirement on 
legislators that it imposes on itself. Legislators, if subject to a mandate 
of equal treatment, no less than judges, and subject to the mandate of 
the rule of law, must treat like groups alike, just as judges must treat 
like litigants alike. Legislators should only differentiate between groups 
for good reasons and not bad, just as judges should only differentiate 
between litigants and cases for good reasons and not bad. Both branches 
should do so, furthermore, toward the end of maintaining as much con-
tinuity as possible, not creating disruption between the past and the 
present. The meaning of the “equality” to be required of legislators, but 
interpreted by judges, is thus overlaid with the judges’ own understand-
ing of the equality they require of themselves. Equal protection of the 
law in the judicial context clearly requires like treatment of likes; this 
is, again, the shared judicial understanding of what equality under law 
means. “Equal protection of law” in the legislative context, but as inter-
preted by judges, requires no less, but also no more.
My claim is that it is this overlay of the demands of adjudicative 
rationality (or nondiscrimination) on the mandate of equality that the 
Constitution imposes on legislatures that has perversely limited the sub-
stantive scope of the mandate. Constitutional equality, on the Court’s 
reading, requires that legislators behave rationally, just as stare decisis, 
precedent, and the rule of law require that judges do likewise, and it 
does so toward the end of conserving and preserving the institutions of 
the past with as little disruption as possible. Equality, so says the Court, 
requires no more. It does not require that legislators undertake legisla-
tion to reduce the substantive economic inequality between persons or 
groups of persons. It does not require that legislators use law to protect 
anyone from anything. It does not require that law be the means by 
which social or economic equality is guaranteed, or comes to pass, or 
at least becomes more likely than not. It requires only that when leg-
islators legislate, they do so rationally. It targets law itself as the evil 
that frustrates equality, rather than inequality as the evil against which 
we might sensibly seek out law’s protection. It does so not because the 
language requires this reading or the history suggests it. If anything, 
the language and history both require something considerably more 
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capacious. It does so because of judicial, jurisprudential habit. Legal 
equality, from a judicial point of view, means the rational differentiation 
of cases toward the end of like treatment. Constitutional equality, then, 
from a judicial point of view, imposes that adjudicative understanding 
of the equal protection they are constitutionally obligated to deliver—
and notably, only that adjudicative understanding of the equal protection 
they are constitutionally required to deliver—on legislators.
It seems to me that this overlay—of a judicial understanding of 
what equality requires of judges onto a constitutional understanding 
of what the constitutional guarantee of equality requires of legislators—
is not a lousy coincidence or an unfortunate verbal pun. Nor is it, in my 
view, a correctable doctrinal mistake. Formal equality is the jurispru-
dential ideal at the heart of the meaning of adjudicative law.6 Treating 
likes alike is what judges do when they are doing their jobs morally 
and doing them well. Put that judicial ideal together with an undeni-
able social fact, to wit, that courts, as well as the larger legal culture, 
have rendered the Constitution, and constitutional law, a child of adju-
dicative law. The conclusion for the constitutional meaning of equality 
is overdetermined: It is a perfectly natural inference that the equality 
guaranteed by that body of adjudicative law, in the eyes of judges, is the 
equality guaranteed by adjudicative law quite generally. Formal equality 
is, therefore, from the pens and minds of judges, the limit of the equality 
required of legislators when they are enacting law.
The consequence of all of this is strikingly hostile to the very idea of 
affirmative welfare rights (in any of its various incarnations). Legislative 
irrationality, not worldly inequality, becomes the target of the guar-
antee of equality when equality is rendered formal. Law becomes the 
evil addressed through the constitutional guarantee, rather than the 
means by which the guarantee is made real. To provide equal protec-
tion, the legislator must behave rationally, meaning, in line with the 
directives suggested by current social reality, just as the judge, if she is 
to decide cases in accordance with the rule of law, must do so in a way 
that is rational and consistent with, rather than at odds with, the past. 
By insisting that the Equal Protection Clause means, basically, a prom-
ise of rationality in legislation, the Court has judicialized the legislator, 
at least with respect to equality: It has made him a mini-judge. The 
only ideals to which we hold him are the ideals and the constraints of 
judging: rationality in categorization and fidelity to the past. We limit 
to the vanishing point his understanding of his very purpose being that 
of transformation, or change, through law; limit to the vanishing point 
his understanding that the substantive equality that might be delivered 
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through law might be part of his constitutional project, rather than law 
being the poison that frustrates equality. The Equal Protection Clause, 
read formally, emasculates the legislator from being an agent of effec-
tive change. The Equal Protection Clause, read formally, as a mandate 
that legislators as well as judges must rationally align their actions with 
the contours of social reality, has become an obstacle, not a vehicle, of 
progressive, egalitarian politics.
What does this portend for the future? Well, if the attraction to a 
formal rather than substantive understanding of equality is indeed a 
function of jurisprudential self-understanding, rather than institutional 
necessity or doctrinal mistake, then it is going to be next to impossible 
to dislodge. Quite generally, in law, if not in life, the past is indeed pro-
logue. In all of adjudicatory law, but particularly in constitutional law, 
the past is read so as to better define and delimit the future. In fact, that’s 
its point. That is just what judge-made law aims to do—to nail down the 
future, so to speak, to preordain it, to render it a known fact, rather than 
an unknown variable, an inchoate possibility. Perhaps for good-enough 
reasons, perhaps not, courts honor the past: Integrity and consistency 
have real moral weight. The past has substantial authority. That’s the 
point of the entire enterprise; it is central to judicial identity. In the con-
stitutional context, furthermore, the moral weight of the past is magni-
fied: The courts will be even less willing to overturn or depart from an 
understanding of equality that is as central to a judicialized understand-
ing of the ideal of law itself as is their interpretation of formal equality. 
They might tinker at the margins, but they are not going to ever depart 
from its core content. Partly for this reason, I believe, progressives 
should not look to the courts, even to idealized counterfactual courts 
staffed with judges appointed by the Obama-Biden administration of 
2008, for either programmatic solutions to problems of economic and 
social injustice or even for more limited declarations of principle on 
which other institutional actors might act.
None of this, however, closes the door on the questions posed at the 
outset of this chapter regarding the true meaning of constitutionalism and 
the future of constitutional development. Obviously, the Equal Protection 
Clause may require minimal social justice, even though the Court has never 
held as much. I’m not suggesting for a moment that we turn our backs 
on the Constitution as a source of moral authority for a future War on 
Poverty or, more generally, as a cultural mandate to achieve a more egali-
tarian society in the twenty-first century. It does mean, though, that the 
American Constitution Society should at least entertain the possibility that 
courts might be jurisprudentially incapable of seeing in the Constitution 
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a range of meanings that are quite self-evidently there, including a man-
date of economic justice. What follows is that we need to ask whether 
the Constitution, or the constitutions, that might be developed outside 
the walls of courts might be fruitfully aligned with progressive activism 
against poverty, even if the adjudicated Constitution is not promising.
Equality and the Legislated Constitution
So, let me turn to what I call the legislated Constitution—by which 
I mean simply the Constitution that legislators are duty-bound to up-
hold. Instead of imagining a liberal judge in 2020, let’s go whole hog 
and imagine an enlightened, or at least conscientious, idealized legis-
lator. That legislator, state or federal, wants to do her moral, politi-
cal, and constitutional duty by the citizenry. That legislator reads the 
Constitution and sees there a mandate that “no state shall deny equal 
protection of the law.” For that legislator, the Constitution carries a di-
rect, linguistically untortured command: The state must provide some-
thing, and what it must provide is equal protection of law.
How is this to be interpreted? It seems to me that there is a more 
natural fit between the well-understood political ideals of conscientious 
legislators, going back to the time of the ancient Greeks, and a founda-
tional, constitutional commitment that the sovereign act in such a way as 
to equally protect the well-being of all and that it do so, in part, through 
the recognition of positive rights. The conscientious legislator is or 
ought to be accustomed to the idea that she acts so as to effect a change 
in social reality. Her ideal for moral action—what it means for her to 
legislate—is for that reason alone more consistent with a Constitution 
that requires, in the name of equal protection of all, substantial inter-
vention into extant social reality, so as to address social and economic 
inequality. Just this bare minimum fit between commonly understood 
ideals of the art of legislation and the idea of positive rights contrasts 
pretty sharply with the position of even the conscientious judge of 2020 
with the best moral and political values imaginable. There is just no 
such easy fit, and in fact it is an awkward fit at best and maybe no fit at 
all between the understood purpose of adjudication, particularly in the 
constitutional context, and a foundational commitment to act in such 
a way as to employ law so as to protect all and to protect equally. The 
judge acts on the basis of principle toward the articulation of a body 
of law the purposes of which—read generously—are to build continu-
ity with the past, hold legislation and legislators at bay, and enforce 
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individual rights to be free of overreaching or irrational law. He does 
not act on the basis of a concern for the well-being of all nor toward the 
end of protecting the well-being of all against unspecified evils, whether 
equally or otherwise.
The legislator, unlike the judge, does not and should not view her act 
as an attempt to secure an uninterrupted fidelity to the past, nor to avoid 
disruption, nor to maximize individual freedom by holding the legisla-
tor at bay, nor to uncover and articulate otherwise opaque legal rules 
through the analogical method of uncovering the rational like treatment 
of likes and then papering it with a carefully verbalized generality. The 
legislator, rather, unlike the judge, presumably acts—legislates—in order 
to change a status quo; she does not act—adjudicate—in order to fur-
ther cement and further rationalize extant social relations. The legisla-
tor, unlike the judge, ought to realize that the work of legislating must 
be directed toward the protection of the interests of all citizens against 
various evils or harms—and that her constitutional obligation, there-
fore, is to legislate in such a way so that protection is bestowed equally, 
rather than view her work as that of thwarting legislation toward the end 
of securing individualized rights. The conscientious legislator, at least, 
might be legitimately convinced that the duty to legislate in such a way 
as to protect the interests of all includes not only a duty to protect against 
the threat of foreign invasion and not only a duty to protect legal entitle-
ments bestowed by the common law, but also, given our particular his-
tory, constitutional and otherwise, a duty to protect against exploitation 
and the subordination that can follow it. Likewise, given our economic 
and constitutional history, such a legislator might be persuaded that the 
evils to be protected against, by law, bestowed equally, include the evils 
that are the side-product of unbridled capitalism, as evidenced by the 
twentieth century’s legislative interventions: the labor legislation of the 
New Deal, the civil rights codes of the 1960s, the environmental legisla-
tion of the ’70s, the anti-age and disability discrimination acts of the ’80s, 
and so on. Indeed, if we reverse our habitual identification of the core 
of constitutional law as consisting of a collection of judicial decisions, 
and look instead at legislative decisions made either pursuant to consti-
tutional mandate or in part inspired by constitutional ideals as the core 
of constitutional law, then it becomes quite clear that the conscientious 
legislator has, at more than a few moments in the history of twentieth-
century constitutional law, viewed her moral obligation and the constitu-
tional mandate under which she works in just this way.
So, a substantive understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
grand phrases is more consistent with the goals of legislation than goals 
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of adjudication. At least, there is not the glaring inconsistency between 
the most natural reading of those clauses and the ideals and practical 
constraints of the legislature as there is with respect to adjudication. The 
lawmaker must act in such a way as to provide equal protection of the law 
to all. He must legislate in such a manner that all are equally protected 
against the harms that can be deterred or prevented through law. The 
constitutional mandate, understood as a directive to the lawmaker, rather 
than the adjudicator, concerns the ways in which law should or could be 
used in order to promote the equal protection of all. Understood this 
way, the Equal Protection Clause is not about protecting people from 
the product of legislation. It is about how to use legislation to protect 
people from other evils. Understood this way, at least this part of the 
Constitution constructs law, in other words, as a rather good thing, all 
things considered. Law is the means by which the constitutional entitle-
ment is secured, rather than the evil against which the constitutional 
entitlement guards us. The lawmaker is the agent of the constitu-
tional protection, rather than an irrational, whimsical, overly emotional 
or impassioned, frenzied, possibly corrupt, undoubtedly racist, homo-
phobic, misogynist, vengeful, interest-obsessed, swashbuckling boozer, 
from whom the lonely and noble individual, in his rights-bearing glory, 
quite sensibly seeks protection.
Let me finish by suggesting what would be required, jurispruden-
tially, to make the promise of the equality guaranteed by the legislated 
Constitution coherent. We don’t currently have a constitutional juris-
prudence that supports even the existence, much less the coherence, 
of the legislated Constitution. We have, instead, a jurisprudence over-
whelmingly committed to three definitional and foundational propo-
sitions, which, when taken together, virtually foreclose any possibility 
of developing a legislated Constitution. The first proposition: Law is, 
definitionally, some combination of that to which courts turn, when 
making law, and that which courts make when deciding cases, but either 
way, it is a part of the adjudicative, not the legislative, process. Second: 
The Constitution is law. Combining these two yields the third: The 
Constitution, as law, is to be interpreted by courts, and apparently 
exclusively so.
To develop a legislated Constitution, we would have to upset that 
conventional apple cart—which should not be all that hard to do. None 
of these definitional equivalencies are required by our constitutional 
history. Yes, the Supremacy Clause identifies the Constitution as law, 
but it does not define law as being “whatever courts say”—that came 
a hundred years later. When Chief Justice John Marshall declared in 
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Marbury v. Madison that it is the Court’s role to say what “the law” is, 
he was, at least according to a growing number of historians, referring 
to the Court’s duty to state the content of ordinary law. This duty to 
state the content of ordinary law does indeed require an inquiry into 
the constitutionality of legislative or common-law pronouncements. It 
doesn’t follow, however, from either the Supremacy Clause or Marshall’s 
utterance that the Court is the only, the ultimate, or the primary inter-
preter of constitutional meaning. The Constitution, in other words, is 
a part of the judicial inquiry into what ordinary legislated or common 
law is, and it is the Court’s duty to state what that ordinary law is. The 
Constitution, however, might also be part of the legislative inquiry into 
what the ordinary law should be. If so, then it is the legislature’s duty to 
act accordingly. In short, neither the Supremacy Clause nor Marshall’s 
dictum, nor the two taken jointly, preclude the constitutional possibility, 
or the constitutional necessity, of a legislated Constitution—a devel-
oped body of statutory law that, with accompanying secondary litera-
ture, articulates the meaning of constitutional guarantees as understood 
and implemented by legislating bodies.
So where does this leave us? The historical work that needs to be 
done to sustain the case for the legislated Constitution is well under way. 
But, with respect to the jurisprudence needed to sustain the legislated 
Constitution, the work is not yet happening. Such a constitutional leg-
isprudence would consist of four largely forgotten, though certainly not 
novel claims. First, it would require the development (or recapture) of an 
ancient understanding of the idea of “law” or, more specifically, of “natu-
ral law,” as consisting of a set of moral imperatives that can and ought to 
guide the art of legislation, rather than as a set of moral imperatives that, 
at most, constrain legislation. Second, it would require an understand-
ing of “constitutional law” as part of that law. We lost that at the mid-
twentieth-century mark, when we began to understand Justice Marshall’s 
ambiguous declaration in Marbury that the Court’s duty is to say “what 
the law is” as an unambiguous declaration that it is the Court’s duty to 
say what constitutional law requires of law. Third, it would require an 
understanding of the state as under a moral duty, a legal duty, and a 
constitutional duty to act in the interest of all, and not just a prohibi-
tion against acting in certain discriminatory ways. We lost that under-
standing, I believe, dating from the mid-twentieth- century’s civil rights 
successes—with that period’s profound distrust of state actors and its cor-
relative sense that legalist ideals can only be achieved through constrain-
ing, rather than guiding, the legislator’s hand. Fourth, it would require 
an understanding of law’s point or purpose as being the protection of 
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people from the oppressions of each other, and not just protection of 
the individual from the state. We lost that dating from the commence-
ment of our “civil libertarian” tradition, which has been given a boost by 
reproductive and sexual freedom cases since the 1970s.
I hope that the American Constitutional Society, in its deliberations 
between now and 2020, will attend to the need to develop a jurisprudence 
that might support the legislated Constitution. Without it— without an 
understanding of what the Constitution requires the legislator to do, 
instead of only an understanding of what the Constitution forbids; with-
out an understanding of the positive value of law, instead of only an 
understanding of its dangers; without an understanding of what, mor-
ally, a conscientious legislator must do in order to fulfill his or her dis-
tinctly political obligations when acting as a free and moral agent—the 
very basic claim of this society that constitutionalism supports the pro-
gressive hope of creating a more equal and less treacherous world hov-
ers between the radically counterfactual and the flatly oxymoronic. The 
Constitution, interpreted by courts as ordinary law, will yield precious 
little by way of progress albeit quite a bit by way of law.
With such jurisprudence in place, we could at least begin to make 
sense of the specific claim that the Equal Protection Clause might 
actually require a congressional, legislated response to substantive in-
equality. More largely, we might begin to make sense of the very grand 
claim of the ACS that progressive politics is somehow supported by, 
or required by, or at least not antithetical to, constitutional mandates, 
properly understood. With such a jurisprudence in place, the platform 
of the American Constitutional Society might become a matter of 
 common sense.
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